The capital charge régime was introduced in New Zealand government departments in July 1991. The régime provides a mechanism for the Crown to require a return on the funds invested in New Zealand (hereafter NZ) government departments. However the current models used to determine the required rate of return (hereafter the capital charge) from departments are private sector models. Therefore, the capital charge required by the Crown will be substantially higher than what departments are able to generate. This study focuses on the models suggested by The Treasury, that is, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)) to determine the capital charge.
that as an investor of capital the Crown was entitled to a return which at a minimum equalled the "return available from alternative uses of the same resources" (p.6).
The rate of return required by the Crown is referred to as the capital charge rate and is calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) . Firstly the CAPM model is applied to determine a notional cost of equity, secondly this notional cost of equity is used in the WACC model to derive a capital charge rate.
Overall Aim
The main aim of this paper is to determine a model which will either reduce or eliminate the problems associated with the current models used to calculate the capital charge rate for government departments in New Zealand.
The specific objectives of the study were to:°a scertain and evaluate the current models used to calculate the capital charge rate applied to New Zealand government departments;°i dentify and evaluate alternative models to calculate the capital charge rate for New Zealand government departments; and°d etermine an appropriate model for calculating the capital charge rate.
Limitations and Assumptions
It should be noted that this research has the following limitations: 1.
Only models suggested in the literature for calculating capital charges in NZ and those currently applied in the public sector of the UK and US as well as that proposed for Australia, will be identified and analysed as possible alternative models for determining the capital charge. The UK, US and Australia are considered appropriate for the purposes of this study because they have similar financial reporting environments pertaining to that in NZ; and 2. Problems associated with the capital base, such as the valuation of assets in NZ government departments will not be considered. This scope limitation has been imposed in order to restrict the study to what can reasonably be investigated within the available time frame.
This paper is organised as follows: Section I outlines the methodology used in this research project. Section II provides an overview of the capital charge régime in New Zealand. Section III evaluates the current models used to calculate the capital charge rate applied to New Zealand government departments. Section IV identifies and evaluates the alternative models to calculate the capital charge rate for New Zealand government departments. Section V summarises the main findings of the paper, and presents conclusions and recommendations.
Section I: Research Methodology
A document study, literature survey and semi-structured interviews were used to evaluate the models proposed by The Treasury to determine the capital charge rate for NZ government departments. The document study was employed to ascertain the current model used to determine the capital charge rate for NZ government departments, and to facilitate an analysis of the results of the current model when applied to the private sector (NZ top forty) companies.
In order to facilitate an analysis of the results of the current model when applied to private sector (NZ top forty) companies, financial data published by Buttle and Wilson Ltd (stockbrokers) was used to determine the NZ top forty companies and their beta and the annual reports of the NZ top forty companies were examined to determine each company's debt to equity ratio.
Semi structured interviews were conducted with seven government departments in total. Eight departments were initially chosen but due to time constraint and the availability of personnel (familiar with operation to the department's capital charge) only seven could validly be used.
The government departments were selected for interviewing using two criteria, that is all negotiating departments and non-negotiating departments with a high proportion of third party revenue to total revenue.
To determine the proportion of third party revenue to total revenue the financial statements of all government departments (as noted in the Departmental Budgets of the Government of NZ for the year ending 30 June 95) were investigated and the departments with the highest proportion of third party revenue to total revenue for the 1993/94 financial year were selected.
The reason for using the proportion of third party revenue to total revenue as a criteria for selecting the non-negotiating department was because the departments that would be effected by the capital charge most would be those receiving most of their income from sources other than the Crown (as mentioned earlier). This is because the prices charged by the department would need to cover the capital charge but at the same time ensure the department did not price itself out of the market. Thus the capital charge would have more of an impact and therefore be taken more seriously than by those departments not effected by third party revenue.
For each department the person selected as the interviewee was the person most familiar with the operation of the capital charge in the department and/or negotiation process used by the department.
In most cases this person was the Chief Financial Accountant of the department. The departments interviewed were as follows: i) Audit office -(Office of Auditor Controller) ii) Commerce Department iii) Customs Department iv) Internal Affairs Department v) MAF vi) Valuation Department vii) Ministry of Transport
A questionnaire was prepared to form the basis of the interview. The questionnaire was designed with the objective of providing insight into the department's view on : i) the negotiation process; ii) the application of the current models in the NZ public sector; and iii) suggestions for improvement of (i) or (ii).
Section II: Overview of the Capital Charge Régime
The financial management reform (FMR) of the public sector in 1989 was implemented to change the way the public sector was managed (Horner, 1992) . In support of this FMR an "incentives project" was put together with a view to provide incentives for improving government departmental performance. The capital charge régime emerged as an integral part of the "incentives project". ii. use the default rate set by The Treasury each financial year (1993/94 = 10.8%; 1994/95 = 9.9%; 1995/96 = 11.5%; 1996/97 = 11.5% ).
The capital charge rate applied by The Treasury has been developed using both the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) model. According to The Treasury (1990) the capital charge régime in effect, recognised that as an investor of capital the Crown was entitled to a return which at a minimum equalled the "return available from alternative uses of the same resources" (p.6).
A return to the Crown for its capital investment in government departments is justified because in order to maintain this investment the Crown must levy taxes, borrow and or divert funds from other investments. All of these activities have costs attached to them. The capital charge régime recognises the cost the Crown has incurred to provide the Capital and compensates it by making government departments pay a return on capital (capital charge).
Therefore, the rationale for implementing the capital charge régime is basically twofold: first to make clear the full costs of goods and services (outputs) produced by departments and secondly to provide the information and incentives needed for efficient management of the Crown's investment in departments (McCulloch, 1991, p.21) .
The Costs of Government Department's Outputs
As in any business there is always a cost (such as interest or dividends) associated with the capital invested into it, whether that capital be sourced from lending institutions or shareholder/owners. In accounting terms the recognition of the cost of capital provides more accurate and therefore useful information for decision making.
Similarly the implementation of the capital charge régime, from an accounting perspective, means that, providing information on the cost of capital allows the full cost of the outputs produced by a department to be ascertained. This provides Ministers with better information for making purchase decisions (The Treasury 1994, p. 3).
If a government department is able to get a reliable figure for the full cost of it's outputs, they will be better equipped to set prices that are fair and competitive for each output.
Financial Incentives for Efficient Management of Assets
Prior to the implementation of the capital charge régime the assets of a government department could be viewed as "free goods" 3 . The main risk of "free goods" in large organisations such as government departments are under-utilisation and inefficient management of assets which in effect means wastage of resources (Dixon, 1990 ).
The capital charge régime provides managers with the financial incentive needed to ensure that assets are only bought if it is cost beneficial to the organisation, and existing assets are fully utilised and monitored. This incentive also encourages managers to dispose of assets bought prior to the regime but that are not fully utilised.
The Mechanics of the Capital Charge Regime
To calculate the capital charge for departments, the formula shown below is applied.
The capital charge is paid to the Crown in two instalments. The reason for this was so that the total capital charge incurred in any financial year would reflect the return required on the average level of taxpayers fund held by the department in that same year.
The Government Estimates (1992) recommend that the government departments allocate the cost of the capital charge across their outputs in a manner consistent with the amount of capital used to produce each output (B.7 Pt.I, p.6).
Horner (1992, p.4) suggests that the most common methods for allocating the total capital charge to either responsibility centres or outputs within a government department are in relation to: i. Net assets employed ii.
The value of the fixed assets employed iii.
Depreciation allocated iv.
Input cost linked to the capital employed.
Whichever method used to allocate the capital charge internally, the regime encourages managers to minimise the amount of capital charge allocated to them by ensuring that: i. surplus assets are identified and disposed of; ii.
existing assets are utilised efficiently; and iii. investment analysis techniques are applied when considering further capital purchases.
In the third Report of the Controller and Auditor General (1995) it was noted that no conclusive opinions were able to be made concerning the effectiveness of the 4 The taxpayers' funds figure is obtained from each Department's audited balance sheet. capital charge itself. In particular the report mentioned concern at the lack of understanding by many departmental managers of the purpose, operation and actual achievements of the capital charge itself (pp.104-105).
Deriving the Capital Charge Rate for Government Departments
Calculating the capital charge rate for government departments involves firstly applying the CAPM model to determine a notional cost of equity, secondly this notional cost of equity is used in the WACC model to derive a capital charge rate. These models have been used since the inception of the capital charge régime for determining the default rate for NZ government departments.
From the 1 July 1993, a pilot scheme of four government departments were given the opportunity to negotiate a department specific rate. This means that instead of being subject to the (default) same rate as other departments (that have very different operations), a department is able to negotiate with The Treasury, a rate that takes into account the nature of its' own operations. It is hoped that if this pilot proves successful then at some stage, all departments will be given the opportunity to negotiate a department specific rate. The details relating to negotiating a department specific rate will be explained later.
Calculating the Default Rate for Government Departments
Most of the variables used to calculate the default rate are given on a high-low range basis. This high-low range basis is used to reflect the fact that some departments' main operations are close to private sector operations eg. Valuation New Zealand (thus the application of the high range values) whereas others are entirely different e.g Department of Social Welfare (low range values).
The Treasury uses a modified CAPM formula to determine the expected rate of return. Mathematically the classical CAPM is expressed as:
Where, R f equals Risk free rate of return; K m equals Market required rate of return and ß equals Beta.
The modified CAPM formula is expressed as:
Expected rate of return (K e^) = R f + [(K m -R f )(ß)]/ (1-t)
Where, (1-tax rate) equals an adjustment to take into account the fact that public sector projects are not subject to company taxation
The risk free rate (R f ) used by The Treasury is the government five year stock rate for the appropriate period. Therefore it is subject to change each year. For example, for calculating the 1994/95 capital charge rate the forecasted annual average for the same period is applied (The Treasury 1994, Annex). The equity risk premium (K m -R f ) represents the amount above the risk free rate that an investor expects from an equity investment. The Treasury (1994, Annex) estimate this premium from a long series of actual market returns net of the risk free rate for each year.
Beta (ß), according to Brealey and Myers (1991) is a measure of market risk. The Treasury use a beta of 1 (high range) to represent average market risk and 0.5 (low range) to represent very low market risk. The adjustment for taxation is the final step in calculating the cost of equity. The effective tax range applied by The Treasury (1994, Annex) is 15% (low range) and 25% (high range).
After the cost of equity (Ke) is calculated using the CAPM model. The WACC model is then applied to determine the default rate (WACC) for the period. The WACC formula used is shown in below:
Where, W e equals Proportion of equity; k e equals Cost of equity; W d equals Proportion of debt; R f equals Risk free rate; and R p equals Risk premium on debt.
The proportion of debt and equity (W d and W e ) used to calculate the default rate is a ratio of 50:50. According to The Treasury (1990/13) this ratio because according represents the average debt to equity ratio found in the private sector. The risk premium (R p ) represents the debt risk premium for individual departments. This figure was not known because of the fact that departments were not allowed to borrow. Therefore as a proxy the factor applying to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was used. Hence the values used by The Treasury for Rp are 0.5% (low range) and 1.0% (high range).
Finally the inflation rate is deducted from the weighted average cost of capital figure to derive the final default rates for the high and low ranges. The average of these two ranges is the default capital charge rate for the financial year. Negotiating a Department Specific Rate Departments are only allowed to negotiate two variables, namely the beta coefficient and the debt to equity ratio. All other variables used in the calculation of the capital charge rate remain fixed and are not considered negotiable.
To determine these negotiable variables departments are encouraged to identify a market counterpart 7 so that the negotiated rate is reflective of that in the market sector relevant to the department. The Valuation Department is one example of a government department able to identify a market counterpart.
Government departments that want to negotiate a rate but have no identifiable market counterpart (eg MAF), are encouraged to determine their beta according to the amount of third party trading, displayed by the department. In cases where government departments are market related and can be expected to display significant third party trading (eg. Department of Internal Affairs), The Treasury suggests that a beta of 1.0 (the high range) be applied. A beta of 0.5 (the low range) is suggested by The Treasury for departments selling most of their outputs to the Crown (eg Inland Revenue Department).
The Beta Coefficient According to The Treasury beta coefficient estimates the covariability of return on a given investment with that of the market average. Pratt (1991) recognises that, beta is only a measure of systematic risk or inherent risk, as unsystematic risk can be diversified away in a capital market. This means that the market only pays a premium for systematic risk. This concept is not transferable into a government setting because unlike firms operating in a capital market, very few government departments have market prices, however all have very little creditor risk (as loans are prohibited) and departments are continuously funded by the government, hence very little business risk. Justifiably Pratt (1991) argues, In the public sector where there are few or no market prices, the CAPM is no better than guesswork because we must guess at the beta level -given that the public sector is government one could argue that the applicable beta is zero (p.33).
Lally 8 (1992) , suggests that when a department is a monopoly provider, and thus has no market equivalent, the department should use, "the beta of companies in the same industry but in other countries" (p.54). However this raises questions as to the relevance of a beta determined for companies which exist in a market conditions totally different from that pertaining in NZ.
The Treasury recognises that the beta coefficient for individual government departments is difficult to obtain however, they suggest that departments engage consultants with expertise in the area to assist them.
The Debt to Equity Ratio
The second variable government departments are permitted to negotiate is the debt to equity ratio (also referred to as the gearing ratio).
In view of the fact that government departments are prohibited from borrowing money 9 and can only incur short term debt (eg trade creditors), in reality the debt to equity ratio will be much lower than that of 50/50. For example the Ministry of Education had a debt to equity ratio 10 of 1/99.
The Treasury acknowledges that the capital base of an entity permitted to borrow comprises two elements: debt and equity. It also recognises that departments are not permitted to borrow. However it still recommends that it is desirable to impute these components (debt and equity), which notionally make up the taxpayers' funds of a department, because it will help departments to achieve a measure of comparability with other entities (presumably private sector entities). This raises the question as to why it is necessary to ensure comparability with private sector entities, especially when it is remembered that the purpose and orientation of the two sectors (public and private) are distinctively different.
To determine the debt to equity ratio the process is similar, if there is a market counterpart then The Treasury's approved policy is to apply the average debt to equity ratio pertaining to that market counterpart. If there is no identifiable market counterpart then a 50% debt: 50% equity (50/50) ratio is recommended.
The Negotiating Departments
The four pilot departments and the rates that they negotiated (using the process outlined above) 11 for the 1993/94 financial year were as follows: i. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 9.1%
ii. Customs Department 11.3% iii.
Department of Internal Affairs 8.9% iv.
Valuation Department 8.9%
Considering the default rate for the 1993/94 financial year was 10.8%, and the rates applicable to the Valuation Department, MAF and the Department of Internal Affairs were lower. Therefore, it raises questions as to the fairness of the models and the variables used in generating appropriate charge rates for government departments.
Section III: Evaluation of the Current Models to calculate the Capital Charge Rate for Government Departments
The Treasury (circular 1990/13) 12 , defines the capital charge rate as the weighted average cost of capital appropriate to a department. According to Pringle and Harris (1987) the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) may be described as, the required return for an investment project based on an average of equity and debt returns where the weights are the respective proportions of equity and of debt used by the firm (p.375).
The use of the CAPM and WACC models to determine a capital charge rate for NZ Government Departments is a concern because according to Lapsley the, "CAPM and WACC have a particular private sector bias without any real appreciation of the distinctive features of public sector capital investment decisions" (1988, p.72).
The appropriateness of applying these models in the public sector can be determined by comparing the nature and/or objectives of both the private and public sectors. For example the overall goals of both sectors may be described as: i. Public Sector -improving society's standards of living by providing health care, education etc. Hence the public sector maybe described as socially orientated;
ii. Private Sector -maximising shareholders wealth. Thus the sector maybe described as profit orientated.
This indicates that the rate determined by these models does not cater for the (difference in nature of the sectors) fact that capital investment decisions in the private sector are made with the main aim to maximise shareholders wealth whereas in the public sector the main aim is to improve or raise society's standard of living. Therefore, the rate determined using these models would theoretically be too high for the public sector to meet without causing a compromise of the public sectors main aim.
Overall, it would seem that by using the CAPM and WACC models, to calculate a capital charge rate in the public sector, an exact parallel between the public and private sectors is being assumed. Yet, as Anderson (1992) notes: There are significant differences [between the two sectors]. Until these are recognised and solutions are found, uncertainty (concerning the capital charge rate) will continue to exist. This confusion is not helping executives in the essential task of planning and presenting options to politicians and the public. The law on capital charge accounting smacks of a superficial application of dogma without thought for practical outcomes (p.40).
From the above discussion it would seem that the application of private sector models to the public sector for the purpose of calculating a capital charge rate is inappropriate. Pratt (1992) , whilst supporting this general position, adds that "a possible exception arises when privatisation is contemplated or possible" (p.51).
Baker (1984, p.16 ) noted that capital budgeting is a major functional aspect of corporate planning and strategy. In the private sector CAPM and WACC form part of the capital budgeting process. That is when Discount Cash Flow (DCF) techniques are used to evaluate investment projects, WACC maybe used as one means of determining a discount or hurdle rate for DCF calculations whereas CAPM provides a method of calculating the cost of equity component needed for WACC.
According to Buck and Groth (1986) , The most commonly encountered approaches to estimating the cost of equity are: the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the discounted cash flow (DCF) and the risk premium methodologies. In addition, recently the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) has also gained favour in some jurisdictions (p.26).
The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The main objective of the CAPM is to measure the relationship between risk and return, and hence the estimated cost of equity. To be more specific the CAPM states, "that the expected risk premium on each investment is proportional to its beta". This means that each investment should lie on the sloping security market line connecting The Treasury bills and the market portfolio (Brealey and Myers 1991, pp.162-3) . The assumptions upon which the CAPM is based clearly indicate that the CAPM is a private sector based technique. However a survey of New Zealand listed companies in 1988 by Cleveland Patterson indicated that out of a total of 99 responding companies, only 24 of these estimated the cost of equity capital. Patterson (1989) also noted that the 24 companies estimated the cost of equity capital, either as a step in their estimate of WACC or as an input to management (p.81). Patterson also found that only 38% of the 24 companies applied the CAPM, whereas 46% indicated that they applied the Accounting return on equity as a method for estimating the cost of equity capital.
A similar study of European firms conducted by James Baker (1984) showed that a majority of companies used a company wide cost of long term capital and debt. In addition Baker noted that, a significant number of firms in each study also mentioned a variety of other proxies used as discount rates, including judgmentally-set cut-off rates (p.20).
An important finding from Baker's (1984) study was that a trend toward the use of more sophisticated techniques was clearly apparent (p.18). However the use of CAPM during that time was not popular. Pratt (1991) highlights one of the problems in applying the CAPM in the public sector when he states, an equity risk premium of 8% is taken to be the average market premium over the risk free rate. The problem here is that the market premium includes capital growth as well as dividends; capital growth will derive from realised and unrealised holding gains. In the absence of a market (in the public sector), there is no means of determining holding gains. Current accounting practices is based on historical costs and does not pretend to reflect value; it provides no basis for determining holding gains (p.33).
Lewis (1991) supports Pratt when he says, The CAPM in my view has some major practical difficulties and does not reflect real life situations; in particular the operation of government departments. The major objection is that in proposing to use this model as a basis for determining the cash charge on equity, the distinction between dividends and capital appreciation is ignored, the effect of which is to capitalise expected future growth into the capital charge (p.26).
Lewis further goes on to say that, Can the government expect to obtain high returns in user charges based on theoretical models, when the sectors they are charging return substantially less than those levels? (p.26).
Buck and Groth (1986) note that, if capital costs are higher than need be, customers pay that element of the bill as well. The policing mechanism to ensure this is simple: capital market participants do not have to provide capital to utilities, but service users do need the product to survive whether it be to receive health care or protection they must pay the price.
The effect of a capital charge rate that is too high may result in the following:°A n increase in the price of services provided by department; or°T he withdrawal or non-provision of services that are not financially viable These two possible implications will ultimately result in the department's inability to achieve it's main reason for existence (primary objective). Therefore the appropriateness of any model applied to calculate a capital charge rate is important.
As an example Lewis (1991) noted that the return on MAF owned land and buildings for 1990 was 6.73%p.a. This figure was shown as being comparable to other market players such as Shortland Properties (6.31% p.a) and City Realities (5.59% p.a) etc. These private sector level of returns poses the question as to how MAF recovers from third parties and pays a capital charge at a rate between 13% and 19% when it is in reality achieving and charging a market return for these assets (p.26).
This raises the obvious point that Departments receiving a large proportion of their income from third parties and for whom the capital charge amount is material will be more effected by the capital charge rate than those who receive the majority of their revenue from the Crown (this is a point further emphasised in the semistructured interview analysis). Kolbe, Read And Hall (1984) evaluated the Capital Asset Pricing Model using three criteria categories. They are: i) theoretical (does it work in principle?) ii) practical (how hard is it to use?); and iii) empirical (how well does it work in practice).
In summary Kolbe, Read and Hall found the following: i) Theoretically the CAPM is logically consistent and generally consistent with modern finance theory. However they noted as a criticism of CAPM theory that, most of the analysis of the CAPM theory focuses on whether a stock's beta with respect to the market is truly sufficient to judge relative risk -are other risk factors needed? (p. 74-75).
In addition they also commented that the quantities/variables needed to apply the CAPM cannot be estimated with enough precision to make the method useful eg. the return on the market rm and the market risk premium E[(r m ) -(r f )] (p. 77).
ii) Practically -the data needed to apply the method is available from various sources however the "true" value of such variables as the rate of return on the market (rm) is unobservable. Koble et al also note that the statistical tools used in CAPM applications are often complex and sophisticated; the associated costs and difficulty are probably the highest of the five methods (Kolbe et al considered estimating the rate of return for Capital in utilities.
(p 79).
iii) Empirically -the CAPM in comparison to the other methods performed better, in terms of its properties when applied to a sample of companies and observed over time (p 95). However the CAPM performed averagely in terms of its use by regulatory agencies.
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital Model
According to Brealey and Myers (1991) WACC is used in capital budgeting decisions to find the net present value of projects that would not change the business risk of the firm.
In Patterson's (1989) study of NZ listed companies 30% of the firms reporting to use DCF techniques specifically used WACC to estimate the discount or hurdle rate, however more than half of these firms used a judgement based target return (p.81). Patterson (1989) also noted that a study of US firms by Schall et al (1978) and Kim et al (1984) indicated a higher use of WACC than in NZ, with a reported proportion ranging from 41% to 48%, while McMahon (1981) reported that 63% of Australian companies employing DCF analysis used WACC as the discount rate (p.81).
Overall, Pattersons survey tended to indicate that NZ companies relied more on accounting based rather than market based criteria when it came to investment decisions (1989, p86) .
He further went on to suggest that one of the reasons this may have occurred in NZ was because of the lack of published information or reliable data needed for estimating information or reliable data needed for estimating cost of capital rates (p.87).
Patterson also noted that a survey by Neuhauser and Viscione (1973) was done relating to the reasons behind the slow acceptance of theoretical developments concerning sophisticated budgeting techniques. One reason identified by many survey respondents was that no one had proved the use of sophisticated techniques would improve performance and hence be cost effective (p.87).
The Method used to Analyse the NZ Top Forty
The capital charge represents the return the Crown expects to receive from its investment in the net assets of government departments. Theoretically, the rate of return the Crown expects to receive should be less than the rate of return a shareholder (who has invested in a commercial venture) would expect. This is because the risks associated with investment in the private sector are far higher than those attached to investment in the public sector. This is especially clear when considering the revenue aspects of both sectors. To generate revenue in the private sector, companies need to satisfy their customers at least to the same level as their competitors. In the public sector there is no risk in regard to revenue, as departments can rely on the Crown to provide them with funds.
Therefore in order to evaluate the appropriateness of the current models used by The Treasury an analysis of the NZ top 40 companies was performed. The purpose of doing this was to determine the capital charge rate that would be generated by these models when applied to organisations that were purely private sector based.
The same method for negotiating a department specific rate (described by The Treasury ) was used to analyse the NZ top forty (as at February 1993). In addition two assumptions were used. The first assumption used The Treasury's recommended debt to equity ratio (50:50). The second assumption used each company's own debt to equity ratio. In both cases the company's own beta was used. The values for all the other variables used were the same as those that The Treasury considered nonnegotiable (fixed) for the 1992/93 financial year (see Table 1 , page 12). The details of this analysis is shown in Appendix A. The results of the analysis showed that the final capital charge rate applying assumption one was 11.60%, whereas assumption two resulted in a final capital charge rate of 11.66%.
Noting that the default rate for the 1992/93 financial year was 13%, the results of this analysis whilst primitive do to some extent indicate that the models or variables used are not appropriate for NZ Government Departments. This being due to the fact that the NZ top forty's average rate of return under both assumptions were lower than the default rate applied to NZ Government Departments at that time (1992/1993) . This indicates that the Crown by using these models are requiring a higher rate of return from the public sector than what would be required from the private sector using the same fixed parameters. Therefore the models do not necessarily generate a fair rate of return for NZ Government Departments considering the differences in risk and orientation.
Negotiating Departments Results and Analysis
Four negotiating departments were interviewed and the response rate shown in table 2 below represent the actual number of departments responses out of four.
The first question in the interview related to the advantages (expected and unexpected) that the negotiating departments encountered from negotiating a department specific rate. The results are as follows: Table 3 shows that there are clear benefits to departments choosing to use the negotiation process. This is because the rates the majority of departments are charged is clearly less than the default rate applied to the remaining non-negotiating departments.
The second question concerned the disadvantages (expected and unexpected) that departments encountered from negotiating a department specific rate. The results of this question are shown in Table 4 below. Overall one of the main disadvantages encountered by the majority of negotiating departments was the lack of information needed to assist them justifiably determine a beta and gearing ratio for their department. In addition, whilst a certain amount of time and resources could be expected for the process, the actual amount of time and resources that departments spent seemed to considerably outweigh that expected. This was more than likely due to the lack of availability information needed.
The third question concerned the basis of each departments initial negotiation with The Treasury for a department specific rate. The basis of initial negotiation refers to the method or means the department used to determine their two negotiable variables (beta and gearing ratio). The results are shown in Table 5 below: Classified the departments activities into categories consistent with market comparators. Each category was assigned a different comparator ranging from a group of related NZ companies to US utilities. The beta and gearing ratio of each comparator was applied to the respective activity.
Used the outputs of the department as a basic unit for determining comparators. Comparators ranging from related industries to US utilities were used to determine a beta and gearing ratio for each respective output. The information relating to US utilities were in most instances provided by The Treasury. However it should be noted that departments did attempt to determine market comparatives in NZ first, but in the absence of information they required, the information for US utilities were used instead. It was interesting to note that none of the departments used consultants to assist them with their initial negotiation. In addition to asking about the basis used, the third question also asked departments whether the basis had changed since the initial negotiation (in the 1993/94 financial year). Three departments said that the basis had not changed and would not unless a drastic change in their operation occurred. However one department noted that the negotiated debt to equity was changed every two years.
The fourth question related to the department's opinion of the negotiation process.
The results are shown in Table 6 below: Restriction to only 2 negotiable parameters means the department has little power to influence the capital charge rate in a major way.
Absence of information in NZ relating to the 2 negotiable variables meant overseas information had to be applied. This information is not entirely reflective of the department's operation in NZ. Overall, it would appear that departments felt that The Treasury were helpful in terms of explaining the process Departments needed to follow in order to negotiate a department specific rate and that The Treasury were forthcoming with the information needed to help them determine their negotiable variables. However departments also indicated that the negotiation of just two variables did not constitute much of a negotiation nor did it effect the capital charge rate that departments would be faced with in a major way.
In addition, the fact that there was a lack of information in NZ pertaining to the two variables (departments were permitted to negotiate) meant information relating to overseas had to be used. This raises questions as to suitability and appropriateness of application of overseas data to the NZ environment.
The fifth question concerned departments opinions of the models used by The Treasury to calculate the capital charge rate. The results were as follows: Concern about appropriateness of models because of the way it has been used implies risk is similar for all non-negotiating government departments Not perfect for the public sector because models were designed for the private sector and gives rates that are too high Works well but The Treasury have identified most of the parameters. These parameters need to be challenged but this would require research The results in Table 7 indicate that half of the negotiating departments accept the models and principles underlying those models. However there is a certain amount of concern about the fact that the CAPM and WACC were chosen without consultation with the departments themselves. In addition concern about the application of these private sector models to the public sector and hence their appropriateness has also been raised.
Only one department however noted that the rates determined by the CAPM & WACC model are too high. Furthermore during the interview it was apparent that whilst departments were aware of the CAPM & WACC models and the fact that they had been applied to determine the capital charge rate, the majority were not familiar with the details of the CAPM & WACC models themselves.
The last question to negotiating departments related to suggestions that departments had concerning the improvement of either the negotiation process of the models used. The results are shown in Table 8 below. From the results it seems that 50% are concerned with the models themselves whereas the other 50% are more concerned with the negotiation process. This would tend to indicate that those concerned with the negotiation process either accept the models as being appropriate for application to the NZ public sector or did not wish to make suggestions because of insufficient knowledge about the models (as mentioned earlier).
The remaining 50% of negotiating departments suggestions related to the models, and their appropriateness in terms of their application to the public sector. The results of this question were very closely linked to the results of questions 4 and 5. This is to be expected as in questions 4 and 5 the departments opinion of the negotiation process and models were covered.
In summary half of the negotiating departments appear to be satisfied with the models used to calculate the capital charge rate. However they have indicated that all variables should be made negotiable in the negotiation process rather than just the two variables that are currently permitted.
The other half have indicated that the appropriateness of the CAPM and WACC models application to the NZ public sector is questionable. This concern is valid considering that all of the negotiating departments had to use information from US public utilities in order to determine their negotiable variables. The use of this overseas information to determine capital charge rates for NZ government departments ( which operate in a totally different business and political environment to that of the US) raises questions as to the fairness of the rate derived by the CAPM and WACC models. Obviously no suggestions regarding the negotiation process was made by this half since the negotiation process (as it exists) stems from the application of the CAPM and WACC models.
Other comments made during the interviews related to the operation of the capital charge régime itself and the effectiveness of it. Most of the departments agreed that the concept of the capital charge régime itself was good. However the systems (for example financial reporting systems within departments) needed to ensure that the régime was effective should have been implemented before introducing the régime.
This point concerning the financial reporting systems is mentioned in the Report of the Controller and Auditor General (1995) which states " To apply the capital charge itself would require operational divisions to have their own financial statements showing divisional equity. This may not be cost -effective" (p.105).
Non Negotiating Departments Results and Analysis
The results of three non-negotiating departments interviews were able to be validly used in this section. The response rate shown in tables 9 to 13 represent the actual number of departments responses out of three.
Five questions in total were addressed to non-negotiating departments. Three of these questions were exactly the same as the last three questions asked of the negotiating departments. The first question asked departments why they chose not to negotiate a department specific rate. Their responses are shown in Table 9 below. No cost / benefit seen on negotiating a department rate
Capital charge is not a material amount for this department Too much time and effort required to negotiate Difficult to find a market counterpart for the department Considers the default rate to be reasonable at the present moment In most cases the departments reason for not negotiating was due to the fact that the capital charge was not a material amount for the department and therefore the costs associated with negotiating a department specific rate (in terms of time and effort) seemed to outweigh the benefits from negotiating a department specific rate. The reason why the capital charge was not material for these departments was due to the fact that these departments are more people intensive rather than capital (base used to apply the capital charge rate to) intensive.
The second question asked departments whether they would negotiate a department rate in the future. The results were as follows: The reasons for this result in most cases were linked to the results of question 1 for non-negotiating departments. However departments did note that negotiating a department rate would only be considered if the departments operations changed so drastically that the capital charge became material or if the default rate became excessively high.
The third question related to the opinion departments had of the negotiation process. The results were as follows: Not really a negotiation because of the restriction to only 2 negotiable parameters.
Very straightforward process outlined in detail by The Treasury.
Too much work required for just two negotiable variables and a low chance of success in terms of The Treasury 's acceptance of proposed variables.
Not enough readily available information in NZ needed to help determine the department's 2 negotiable variables.
May require the use of consultants
Little incentive given to negotiate a capital charge rate Overall it would appear that departments felt that the process does not allow them to effect the department's capital charge rate in any major way. Therefore the time, effort and cost that maybe associated with the process would not be cost beneficial (result of question 1) to the department. This implies that no real incentive is seen by these departments in using the negotiation process. However it was noted that The Treasury had outlined a clear method for departments to use if they wished to use the negotiation process.
In addition like the results for the negotiating departments the lack of readily available information in NZ needed to determine the two negotiable variables was mentioned. This may also be a deterrent for departments in terms of using the process to negotiate a department specific rate.
The fourth question concerned departments opinions of the models used by The Treasury to calculate the capital charge rate. The results were as follows: From a theoretical point of view the CAPM and WACC are good in terms of reflecting the true cost of capital.
In practical terms using the CAPM and WACC in the public sector is questionable given the differences in risk from the private sector. In this case only one department expressed an opinion about the models. This department's comment looked at the theoretical and practical point of using the models. In terms of their theoretical view this department noted that some academics advocate the CAPM and WACC models for determining the cost of capital and that the allowance of this was important in terms of investment decisions by each department. They also noted that whilst it was debatable as to whether or not the models determined a fair cost of capital for NZ government departments, there were few other models (that were theoretically sound in finance terms) that could be used.
The last question related to departments suggestions concerning either the models or the negotiation process. The results were as follows: The reasons for this result were as follows: i. if the capital charge for a department is not material then there is no need to consider the models or the negotiation process; and ii.
if the majority of a department's funding came from the Crown then there would be no encouragement to consider the models or the negotiation process.
Overall the results of this section tend to support the comment made in the Report of the Controller and Auditor General (1995) that there appears to be a lack of understanding by departmental managers of the purpose, operation and actual achievements of the capital charge régime as an incentive (p. 105).
Summary of Interview Results and Analysis
Overall the results of these semi -structured interview gave a practical insight not only into departments thoughts about the negotiation process and the CAPM and WACC models, but also departments thoughts about the capital charge régime as a whole.
The results of the interview with the negotiating departments showed that overall departments were split in terms of their opinions on the models and their application to the NZ public sector. The same applied to the negotiation process. However they all perceived a benefit in using the negotiation process to negotiate a department specific rate. This was because they felt it gave them the ability to negotiate a rate that would better reflect the risk their department faced. The main disadvantage identified by the departments in terms of negotiating a rate related to the absence of readily available information in NZ for market counterparts and the actual amount of time, effort and resources needed to negotiate. Another main result identified by the interview was that half of the departments thought the models should be reconsidered or debated in terms of their appropriateness for NZ government departments. The other half focused on the negotiation process and thought that all variables needed to be made negotiable rather than just the two currently used.
The results of the interview with the non-negotiating departments showed that their main reason for not negotiating a department specific rate was because they saw no cost / benefit in negotiating a rate, in that too much time and effort was required.
Another factor was that the capital charge was not a material amount for the departments. In addition they also indicated that it was not likely that they would negotiate in the future unless a drastic change in operations took place.
In terms of the negotiation process the main opinion related to the fact that departments did not consider the process to constitute much of a negotiation because of the restriction to only two negotiable variables. Overall the majority of departments had no substantial opinion on the models.
Section IV: Alternative Models to calculate the Capital Charge Rate for New Zealand Government Departments
According to Kirsten (1979) , The most significant determination in the rate making process is the allowance of a reasonable rate of return on the property devoted to the public service. Current costs reflect the present risks and the real price of capital in the market place. It is these current costs which represent the 'incremental' cost of capital to a utility on which the reasonable rate of return calculation should be based (p.17).
Along with the CAPM model, Kolbe et al identified and evaluated four other cost of equity estimation methods for public utilities. They were: i) Comparable Earnings ii) Discounted Cash Flow iii) Risk Positioning iv) Market to Book Ratio Kolbe et al (1984) evaluated these methods using three main categories of criteria. Table 5 below shows a summary of criteria applied to these methods. Note: + = above average/good 0 = average/acceptable -= below average/poor a = Not tested. ? = ambiguity; depends on exact details of method If a method gets more than one score (eg. comparable earnings on logical consistency), the implication is that there are two theories or assumptions involved and each scores differently.
Source Kolbe et al (1984, p.125)
From the evaluation summary it is clear that the DCF method performs best in terms of the evaluation criteria applied by Kolbe et al (1984) . From Patterson's (1989) study of Discount rates used for DCF analysis, judgement based target returns followed by WACC and the cost of debt capital alone were identified as the most popular in terms of use by New Zealand companies.
The cost of debt as a discount or hurdle rate would appeal because of it's simplicity in terms of determination and application. However because it ignores the opportunity costs of ordinary equity in the firm's capital structure, its use may lead to acceptance of many projects which are detrimental to the interests of shareholders (Patterson 1989, p.81) .
However in terms of the public sector, borrowing (debt capital) is prohibited (Public Finance Act, 1989) , therefore the cost of debt capital is not a real issue. Pratt (1991) noted that, the conceptual basis for use of WACC exists because it is a firm's opportunity cost of capital. This opportunity cost for government could be taken as the interest rate on government undated stock. To this could be a added a risk premium, if it is deemed appropriate. Risk in relation to provision of monopoly services could be said to be virtually nil. One could ask why government operates in a competitive market. Should such operations not be privatised? My view is to keep the issue simple and use the interest rate on government stock (p.34).
This suggestion also offers simplicity in terms of the determination and application of the rate. However using the rate on government stock would mean that the opportunity cost to government is being catered for, but the opportunity cost to society as a whole is ignored. Ninety percent (90%) of the government 1995 revenue is sourced from taxation (Report of the Controller and Auditor General, 1995 , p.12) . Therefore society as a whole may easily be compared to the investors of a firm (government). Thus if the view of opportunity cost to society as a whole was taken then according to Pratt (1991) technically it would be necessary to apportion between funds withdrawn from private consumption and those withdrawn from corporate investment. This approach would be much more complicated then the government opportunity cost basis.
In term of cost of capital in the Australian public sector Hathaway and Dodd (1993) , note that the Australian federal Government is in the process of requiring Government Business Enterprises to make an economic return on the assets under their control. This return or cost of capital is to be calculated using an adjusted classical CAPM model (see figure 1 ). This model differs from that used by NZ's The Treasury Department in that every factor is converted to the after company tax, before personal tax return equivalent. The NZ model's tax adjustment on the other hand is done to take into account the fact that public sector projects are not subject to company taxation.
One of the problems highlighted by Hathaway and Dodd (1993, p.17) can be seen from the comparative plot of the Australian The Treasury CAPM and the standards CAPM shown in Figure 2 below. ( NOTE: Terms used are expressed differently in the source but mean the same as that shown eg K e is referred to as R e. )
This comparative plot illustrates one problem faced by the Australian model this being that; "investors in zero risk assets should expect to make less than the risk-free rate after company tax and before personal tax" (Hathaway and Dodd, 1993, p 17) .
In Britain the concept of Capital charging has been implemented into the National Health Service. The principal features of capital charging as applied to health authorities in Britain are as follows: a) Capital charges will consist of a depreciation charge based on the current value of authorities capital assets, plus an interest charge of 6% of the current value of assets; b) all assets (and groups of assets) with a replacement value exceeding £1000 will be included; c) assets acquired by gift, or used for regional or district administrative purpose, will not be subject to capital charging; and d) self governing hospitals will not pay capital charges as such, but will be subject to the same discipline through a requirement to depreciate assets and to meet a financial target designed to secure the appropriate real rate of return on their assets (Kemp 1990, p.17) . Kemp (1990) whilst supporting the capital charging concept, raises concerns regarding the basis used to calculate the capital charge, the complexity of the arrangements for the introduction of the capital charge, the increased workload and hence costs associated with this particular regime chosen by the NHS for example Kemp (1990) notes that the, requirement to include groups of assets which individually cost less than £1000 but collectively exceed that figure brings its own problems of definition, consistency and workload. Similarly the obligation to calculate depreciation and interest (and to revalue assets) on a quarterly rather than an annual basis, greatly increases the workload and brings problems of budgeting, costing and credibility with managers responsible for exercising budgetary control (p.17). Kemp (1990) further notes that use of the current cost basis will lead to higher capital charges in the NHS compared to the private sector (p.17).
Overall it would seem that there are merits and drawbacks associated with any model applied to the public sector in order to calculate a capital charge. However, because of reasons mentioned earlier it is essential that the model chosen be appropriate to the nature of the public sector. Appropriate in this context referring to logical, practical and simple in terms of application.
In this regard it would seem that the alternative models best fitting this description would be: a) Discounted Cash Flow approach (Kolbe et al, 1984) ; or b) The interest rate on government stock (Pratt, 1991) .
The latter would appear to be more appropriate than the former in terms of use in the Public Sector.
Section V: Summary Conclusions and Recommendations
The overall aim of this study was to determine a model which will reduce or eliminate the problems associated with the current models used to calculate a capital charge rate for government departments.
The document study showed that the models have a particular private sector bias in terms of the information they required. The same was noted for the negotiation process. The NZ top forty companies analysis showed that when the models were applied to the private sector the average charge rate for the top 40 was lower than the default rate applicable at that time (13%) to the NZ Government Departments. This provided tentative evidence of the lack of appropriateness of the models for NZ Government Departments.
The semi-structured interviews tended to indicate that half of the negotiating departments accepted the models but suggested that all variables be made negotiable whereas the other half were concerned about the appropriateness of the models for NZ Government Departments. One of the main issues identified by these departments (relating to the application of the models) was the lack of readily available information needed, and the time and cost associated with determining negotiable variables (used in the CAPM). Non negotiating departments had no substantial comments to make relating to the models. However they did think that the costs outweighed the benefits in terms of negotiating a department specific rate for themselves.
The literature review indicated that the CAPM was used in some US public utilities to determine the cost of capital and that it was proposed to be used in the Australian public sector for the same reason. However it was also established that the problems associated with the CAPM mainly concerned the related costs of implementing the method and the CAPM's validity due to the assumptions upon which it is based.
In summary, the problems with the models as identified by this study tend to relate to the following areas:°p rivate sector bias of models;°l ack of readily available information needed to apply the models;°a ssociated costs, time and effort required when using the models;°q uestion of appropriateness for NZ Government Departments.
In order to determine a more appropriate or fairer rate for NZ Government Departments it is recommended that consideration be given to applying another model for determining the capital charge rate for NZ Government Departments.
The literature review identified a number of possible alternative models that would reduce or eliminate the problems with the current models (identified above). In terms of fairness, simplicity of determination and application the interest rate on government stock would appear the most logical method to use for determining the rate of return required by the Crown. The mechanics of this suggestion is beyond the scope of this study, however it maybe an area for further research.
The Treasury (1991) Putting it simply -an explanatory guide to Financial Management Reform.
The Treasury Circular (1990, October Average of high ranges 13.99 Rf = risk free rate: Rp = risk premium on debt Rpeq = risk premium on equity Average of low ranges 9.28 NOTE: Growth inflation rate = 2
